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Abstract 
Auditor Independence: A Study of the Perceptions of Senior Auditors 
The trustworthiness of an audit report rests on the perception of auditor independence. 
However, several factors can affect those perceptions, ultimately affecting market confidence. 
This study aims at providing a deep understanding of auditors’ perceptions of auditor 
independence, particularly analysing whether and how their perceptions are affected either by 
the provision of non-audit services, competition, the size and tenure of the audit firm or the 
client’s financial condition. Qualitative research was held through semi-structured interviews. 
Both the provision of non-audit services and tenure have generated great consensus amongst 
interviewees. Rotation and litigation exposure were mainly perceived as enhancement factors. 
Keywords Auditing, Auditor independence, Perceptions  
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I. Introduction 
 Following the financial crisis, the European Commission reformed the audit market 
(Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Ever since, several measures have been implemented in an attempt 
to achieve financial stability, with greater attention being devoted to the importance of audits 
in stabilizing the financial system (European Commission, 2010; Quick & Schmidt, 2018). In 
addition, audits play an important role on the considerations of investors and other stakeholders, 
as they provide an opinion on the reliability of entities’ financial statements (ibid). Therefore, 
by strengthening public trust, audits ultimately contribute to the orderly running of markets 
(European Commission, n.d.). 
  Nevertheless, an audit report is only valuable as long as it comprises trustworthy 
information (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). Actually, the relevance of audited 
information depends on the belief that auditors are independent, otherwise the audit opinion 
will be meaningless (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Gul, 1989). Since the perception of 
auditor independence is widely accepted to increase auditor credibility (Dopuch et al., 2003), 
independence is required to be “the unshakeable bedrock of the audit environment” (European 
Commission, 2018, p. 3). However, several factors have long been suggested to affect users’ 
perceptions of auditor independence (Gul, 1989).  
 Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how senior auditors perceive auditors’ 
independence, particularly analysing whether and how these perceptions are affected by a set 
of variables. These variables comprise the provision of non-audit services, competition, the size 
and tenure of the audit firm and the client’s financial condition. Similarly, enhancement factors 
are also addressed.  
 The following section reviews the main issues believed to impact the perceptions of 
auditor independence. Subsequently, methodology is described, followed by an analysis of the 
research’s main findings. Final conclusions are then presented. 
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II. Literature Review 
Auditor Independence 
Auditor independence can be defined as the ability to make unbiased judgements and 
audit decisions, free from other parties’ pressures and influences (Alleyne et al., 2006; 
Bazerman et al., 1997). Although some authors suggest objectivity as an equivalent concept of 
independence (DeFond et al., 2002), Bartlett (1993, p. 55) simplifies this notion by excluding 
“nonspecific terms” as integrity or objectivity and defining independence as “an unbiased 
mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and financial reporting”. 
Usually, two related dimensions of auditor independence are distinguished, namely, 
independence in fact and independence in appearance (Alleyne et al., 2006; Dopuch et al., 2004; 
Beattie et al., 1999). While the former is an unbiased state of mind that allows the auditor to 
withstand influences that compromise professional judgement, the latter relates to the 
avoidance of circumstances that would lead informed third parties to reasonably conclude that 
the ability of the auditor to make unbiased judgments had been compromised (AICPA, 2014). 
Since independence in fact is not directly observable, Dopuch et al., (2003) highlight 
the impossibility to regulate an individual’s mindset in a timely manner. Instead, regulators 
must rely on the appearance dimension, outlining the importance of public perception (Dopuch 
et al., 2004). Accordingly, Shockley (1981, p. 785) states that “credibility depends ultimately 
on the perception rather than on the fact of independence” and Holland and Lane (2012) 
reinforce this line of reasoning by recognising auditor independence as a key attribute to 
establish confidence in information provided, and eventually, to accomplish audit quality. 
Moreover, DeAngelo (1981) argues that audit quality is the joint probability that an auditor will 
both discover a misstatement in the accounting system (conditional on perceived auditor’s 
competence) and report the known material error (conditional on perceived auditor’s 
independence) (Quick & Schmidt, 2018; Bell et al., 2015).  
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Threats and Enhancement Factors 
 Prior literature has long sought to identify the factors that may affect users’ perceptions 
of auditor independence. Nevertheless, it often focuses on potential threats to independence, 
that is, challenges and sources of pressure believed to impair auditor independence, as opposed 
to factors that enhance public perceptions (Alleyne et al., 2006; Umar & Anandarajan, 2004). 
According to Simunic (1984, p. 679), “any situation which increases the probability that an 
auditor will not truthfully report the results of his audit investigation can be viewed as a threat 
to independence”. Moreover, some assert that auditors cannot always be independent and 
objective, given the relationship they must maintain with their clients in order to obtain 
appropriate evidence and future revenue (Umar & Anandarajan, 2004). 
 Commonly addressed factors believed to impact auditors’ independence include the 
degree of competition within the audit market, client size and the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS). Other discussed factors comprise, for instance, tenure, the client’s financial 
condition and opinion shopping opportunities (Alleyne et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 1999; Knapp, 
1985; Shockley, 1981). 
Nonetheless, several factors are argued to counterbalance threats and to improve auditor 
independence and objectivity as, for instance, reputation concerns and litigation exposure (Lim 
& Tan, 2008). Additionally, regulatory factors such as the existence of audit committees, 
control over the appointment and remuneration of auditors, effective discipline of companies 
and auditors, and strong enforcement of standards, are argued to promote perceived auditor 
independence (Alleyne et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 1999).  
Non-audit Services (NAS) 
Among the previously identified factors, the provision of NAS has been one of the most 
controversial (Gul, 1989). In fact, there is no consensus in literature on whether rendering non-
audit services influence auditors’ ability to objectively evaluate financial statements (Bartlett, 
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1993). Although some studies suggest a negative effect on auditors’ independence (Quick & 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Beattie et al., 1999; Shockley, 1981), others found NAS to 
positively impact perceived independence (Gul, 1989). Furthermore, other researchers show no 
evidence or inconclusive results (DeFond et al., 2002; Knapp, 1985). 
The provision of non-audit services to clients raise two main concerns. One relates to a 
strengthened economic bond between auditor and auditee, that is, to an increased financial 
reliance on the client: as an unfavourable opinion can possibly compromise not only audit 
relationships, but non-audit relationships as well, a fear of potentially losing increased revenue 
may impair auditor independence (Lim & Tan, 2008; Alleyne et al., 2006; DeFond et al., 2002; 
Bazerman et al., 1997). Additionally, the provision of such services, as consulting, can bias 
auditors’ professional judgement as they must review their own work. Actually, auditors’ may 
be motivated to ignore or conceal errors related to advisory services so to protect other services 
reputation (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Simunic, 1984; Shockley, 1981). 
On the other hand, proponents of NAS rendering argue that the provision of both audit 
and non-audit services may improve auditor independence (Dopuch et al., 2004). One possible 
reasoning follows Goldman and Barlev’s (1974) view which suggests that offering non-routine 
services enhances auditor singularity and value to the client, hence improving auditor’s ability 
to resist client pressure and, consequently, to remain independent (Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). 
Additionally, since both functions require information about the very same company, 
knowledge spillovers1 may emerge from the joint provision of services, hence increasing audit 
efficiency and quality (Bell et al., 2015; Beattie et al., 1999; Simunic, 1984). Further, supporters 
enhance that advisory services are typically rendered by separate departments (Quick & 
Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Gul, 1989), and that clients additionally benefit from cost 
                                                 
1 Benefits arising from interdependencies or interactions between joint provision of services (Simunic, 1984). 
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reductions as search and transaction costs should be reduced when acquiring NAS from the 
auditor (Simunic, 1984). 
Notwithstanding, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) postulate that “a lack of 
independence can neither be justified by efficiency arguments nor by the chance of increased 
effectiveness in the auditing and consulting areas” (p. 153). Further, the authors declare that 
“improved consulting services are primarily beneficial for the auditor and the client whereas a 
lack of independence harms the interests of external addressees” (p. 154). 
Competition 
An intensively competitive market is usually claimed to increase auditors’ economic 
dependence2 on clients as they can easily obtain services from an alternative company (Beattie 
et al., 1999; Gul, 1989). Regardless of the reasons, either simply fees minimization or search 
for a more acquiescent opinion, perceived independence will be at stake as clients’ incentives 
and opportunities for replacement increase (Shockley, 1981). Additionally, competitive 
environments often lead accounting firms to engage in low-balling, that is to say, to accept 
unprofitable discounted fees in the early years, so to become the new auditor (Quick & Schmidt, 
2018; Bazerman et al., 1997). However, by lowering fees below audit cost there is an 
exacerbated pressure to compromise their independence, hence retaining clients and subsequent 
payoffs from the investment (Quick & Schmidt, 2018; Bazerman et al., 1997). 
Although empirical results typically support the above-mentioned insights (Knapp, 
1985; Shockley, 1981), Gul (1989) found environment competition to strength perceived 
auditor independence. One possible explanation refers that as competition increases, auditors 
attempt to create a favourable public image, resembled to impartiality, so to retain their clientele 
(ibid). 
                                                 
2 Economic dependence can be thought of as an inducement for auditors to impair their independence and report 
favourably in order to maintain clients (Reynolds & Francis, 2001). 
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Finally, alongside audit market competition, auditors also come across accounting 
firms’ strict expectations, and failure to meet those can often lead to withdrawal (Bazerman et 
al., 1997). As a result, auditors must handle both dimensions of competitiveness, which may 
negatively impact their independence by allocating considerable attention to short-term revenue 
(ibid). 
Audit Firm Size 
Earlier research suggests that the size of the audit firm may impact perceived auditor 
independence. When compared to larger-sized audit firms, Shockley (1981) found smaller firms 
to be perceived as less independent (Umar & Anandarajan, 2004). Gul (1989) delivered 
consistent results. 
As larger firms are expected to maintain a larger clientele, it assures that no particular 
client is a considerable source of firm revenue because the client’s related fees constitute a 
smaller fraction of the company’s total revenue (Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). However, for 
smaller-sized firms, a single client can cause significant damages. Actually, considering 
substantial loss of revenue, negative outcomes, as personnel reductions or lower 
compensations, may follow (Reynolds & Francis, 2001). Additionally, specific characteristics 
intrinsic to small firms’ audit practices, as the propensity to develop more personalised services 
or closer relationships with clients, may induce smaller firms towards a more indulgent and 
favourable report (Reynolds & Francis, 2001; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Therefore, given the 
size of its portfolio of clients, larger firms are perceived as more independent (Reynolds & 
Francis, 2001). 
Moreover, following an uncovered lack of independence, the auditor’s reputation can 
be damaged, meaning that the broader the number of clients, the greater the risk of losing 
additional clients’ revenue (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005). Hence, a superior number 
of clients will serve as a warranty against misconducts, and consequently, as an incentive to 
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audit independence and quality (ibid). According to DeAngelo (1981, p. 184), “the larger the 
auditor as measured by number of clients, the less incentive the auditor has to behave 
opportunistically and the higher the perceived quality of the audit”. 
Tenure 
Besides the above-mentioned factors, audit tenure has also been discussed as having a 
potential impact on auditor independence. In fact, some argue that a lengthy association 
between auditor and client lessens independence (Beattie et al., 1999). This assertion is usually 
explained through the notion that a long audit tenure leads the accounting firm to closely relate 
to its client’s management interests, hence relying on their accounting practices and 
consequently, losing scepticism (Quick & Schmidt, 2018; Shockley, 1981). Furthermore, after 
a lengthy association, a truly independent stand becomes difficult to take as the auditor becomes 
complacent and depends more on previous work, hence lowering his efforts and disregarding 
rigorous audit procedures (ibid). 
On the other hand, opponents of the preceding viewpoint consider mandatory auditor 
rotation as detrimental to independence, i.e., that extended relationships may actually improve 
auditor independence (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Moreover, opponents argue that through audit 
repetition, and a subsequent improved understanding of client’s operations and processes, 
mature firms can easily detect accounting misstatements, thus providing a more efficient and 
economical service, when compared to new auditors (Quick & Schmidt, 2018; Shockley, 1981). 
In addition, newly acquired auditors are expected to lack firm-specific knowledge and heavily 
rely on management information during initial years (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). As a result, 
clients are anticipated to perceive mature accounting firms as more valuable, hence intensifying 
auditors’ ability to resist management pressure and to remain independent (Quick & Schmidt, 
2018; Shockley, 1981). 
10 
 
As auditors of a recently acquired firm must handle significant knowledge accumulation 
in a short period of time, Bell et al. (2015) find that first-year audits are more often classified 
as substandard audits (Knapp, 1991). Nevertheless, their findings suggest a significant 
improvement in audit quality afterwards, indicating that recent audit relationships may involve 
a considerable learning curve, which is consistent with auditor’s knowledge accumulation. 
However, their results also corroborate a decline in audit quality as tenure becomes very long. 
Financial Condition 
Knapp (1985) found auditee’s financial condition to negatively influence auditor’s 
ability to withstand management pressure (Beattie et al., 1999). According to the author, the 
healthier a client’s financial condition the lower the risk of legal exposure. Hence, the 
accounting firm may be less encouraged to withstand management pressure, increasing the 
client’s perceived ability to attain its ideal outcome (Knapp, 1985). Actually, given a client’s 
robust financial condition, the chance of an auditor being held responsible for a controversial 
decision is remote, thus impairing audit firm’s perceived independence (ibid). Conversely, 
when the client’s financial condition is poor, the audit outcome is unlikely to correspond to 
client’s preferences, as the audit firm fears an increased legal exposure (Gul, 1989).  
Nonetheless, Gul (1989) found client’s financial condition to insignificantly affect 
subjects’ perceptions, reasoning that subjects possibly lack awareness that auditor’s 
independence could be impaired, the stronger the client’s financial condition. 
Opinion Shopping 
Opinion shopping is usually understood as the search for an auditor willing to 
compromise independence and sustain a client’s accounting procedure in order to fulfil 
intended reporting objectives (Lu, 2006). Even though some auditor replacements follow sound 
reasons, others may simply happen with the aim of finding a suitable audit opinion (ibid). 
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Lennox’s (2000) research deduces two main findings: first, auditor switches happen 
more frequently after clients receive modified opinions, and second, auditor replacement 
increases the prospects of a change in audit opinion. Therefore, these conclusions suggest that 
clients effectively engage in opinion shopping practices (ibid). Furthermore, opinion shopping 
and resulting threats to discharge auditors may impair auditor independence, causing material 
misstatements to deliberately occur (Lu, 2006). Although opinion shopping may be perceived 
to negatively impact auditor independence, and subsequently, auditor quality, Lu (2006) shows 
inconsistent results, i.e., that neither is impaired by potential dismissals or opinion shopping.  
In order to mitigate opinion shopping, debate has mostly concentrated on mandatory 
auditor rotation as opposed to mandatory auditor retention (ibid). 
Auditor Rotation 
Auditor rotation has been discussed as a means of enhancing auditor independence 
(Daniels & Booker, 2011). Essentially, by restricting the number of consecutive years an audit 
firm is allowed to assess an auditee’s financial statements, regulators expect to reduce the 
economic bond between the two, hence decreasing the possible impairment of auditor 
independence (Quick & Schmidt, 2018; Daniels & Booker, 2011). Additionally, the recently 
selected auditor is expected to employ a “fresh perspective” to auditee’s financial reporting and 
to be encouraged to reveal possible irregularities of the previous audit firm (Quick & Schmidt, 
2018). Furthermore, this approach could be helpful to avoid negative effects arising from 
lengthy auditor tenure as, for instance, complacency, reliance on previous work, lack of rigor, 
and reliance on clients’ integrity and accounting practices (ibid).  
 However, an AICPA study found audit failures to be more likely during an auditor’s 
initial years auditing a specific company, thus sustaining that auditor rotation can intensify the 
possibility of audit failures, as newly assigned auditors possibly lack sufficient understanding 
of the client’s business, which is crucial to identify accounting errors (Daniels & Booker, 2011). 
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Besides, if the investment cannot be offset within the restricted tenure, the auditor’s willingness 
to invest in client-specific knowledge can decrease (Quick & Schmidt, 2018).  
Earlier research primarily suggests that auditor rotation induces improved auditor 
independence perceptions. Quick and Schmidt (2018) found that a lenghty tenure may 
compromise independence, as auditors are perceived to become complacent and depend more 
on prior audits, resulting in lower effort and rigor. Nonetheless, their results do not enhance the 
importance of client-specific knowledge for perceived audit quality. Likewise, Daniels and 
Booker (2011) found audit firms’ rotation policies to increase loan officers’ perceptions of 
auditor independence, despite not impacting their perceptions of audit quality. 
Auditor Retention 
Whereas auditor rotation rests on replacements, auditor retention aims at preventing 
audit firms’ substitution for a determined period of time (Lu, 2006). 
Although rotating auditors potentially enhance auditor independence perceptions, there 
is no guarantee that the client will not intimidate the audit firm by threating it with a possible 
discharge (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). In fact, by fearing dismissal before the rotation period 
ends, companies can compromise their independence (ibid). As a result, the mandatory 
retention of an auditor within an explicit length of time ensures protection against management 
pressures, thus enhancing auditor independence (ibid). Likewise, some support mandatory 
auditor retention in order to lessen opinion shopping opportunities (Lu, 2006). 
Nonetheless, in a mandatory retention setting, auditors may become excessively 
confident insofar as it concerns their position. Actually, as the client must retain the auditor for 
a certain length of time, audit firms have economic incentives to decrease their efforts (Quick 
& Schmidt, 2018). Furthermore, if the rotation period is lengthier than the retention period, 
auditors have additional economic incentives to impair their independence, given the 
opportunity to be re-assigned by the auditee (ibid). 
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Joint Audits 
Joint audits can be described as the shared performance of audit work by two different 
audit firms that jointly sign the audit report (Deng et al., 2014).  
Several joint audits related characteristics have been appointed as potentially improving 
perceived auditor independence. First, as the audit is performed by two different firms, audit 
fees must be shared amongst them, expectedly reducing the economic bonding it exists in a 
single auditor setting (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Additionally, it is easily acceptable that two 
auditors are more prone to withstand management pressure, hence increasing the chances of 
providing an impartial opinion (ibid). Furthermore, an improved perception of independence 
follows the “four-eyes principle” and related review of the other auditor’s work (ibid). Lastly, 
if one of the firms is replaced, joint audit settings also mitigate the newly appointed firm’s lack 
of client-specific knowledge in the initial years of the engagement (ibid).  
On the other hand, joints audits can negatively influence auditor independence 
perceptions, as cooperative work raises the opportunities for “free-riding” (Quick & Schmidt, 
2018). Under this circumstance, one of the auditors can attempt to take advantage of the other 
firm’s work, by shirking its responsibilities and reducing its own effort (ibid). In addition, it 
may not be very efficient to collaborate if two different sized firms attempt to complete the 
same amount of work (Deng et al., 2014). Specifically, given the better expertise of the bigger 
firm, the smaller one is naturally expected to take longer to finish the task (ibid). 
III. Methodology 
This study aims at providing a deeper understanding of auditors’ perceptions of auditor 
independence, as well as the reasons behind such insights. Therefore, a qualitative research was 
conducted given its explanatory character which, according to Ryan (2002, p. 144), “attempt[s] 
to explain the reasons for observed accounting practices”, being suitable to “understand and 
explain [...], rather than to produce generalizations” (ibid, p. 144).  
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In order to guarantee both resembled questions were asked and the flexibility to explore 
new ideas (Ryan, 2002), semi-structured interviews were conducted using an interview script 
(Appendix A). The questions were developed in order to understand whether previously 
discussed factors are perceived by auditors to impact independence, and if so, how would those 
materialize. Furthermore, the script comprised nine questions, which were further reduced to 
eight: as the interviews phase advanced, questions five and six turn out to merge. 
Auditors were contacted through personal networking, although only one was 
personally known. Altogether, six auditors (one assistant, two seniors, two managers and one 
partner) were interviewed (two face-to-face and four by telephone), between October and 
November 2018. Of those, five either belong or belonged to ‘Big 4’ companies, and one 
currently belongs to a medium-size audit company. Table I presents further information 
regarding interviewees and the gathering of qualitative data. 
Table I: Interviews and Interviewees Data 
 Date Via Duration Function Company 
Interview 1 30th Oct. Telephone 15 mins. Assistant Big 4 
Interview 2 31st Oct. Face-to-face 35 mins. Manager Deloitte 
Interview 3 31st Oct. Face-to-face 40 mins. Manager Medium 
Interview 4 2nd Nov. Telephone 10 mins. Senior PwC 
Interview 5 13th Nov. Telephone 10 mins. Senior PwC 
Interview 6 14th Nov. Telephone 15 mins. Partner KPMG 
 
Every interview was recorded and subsequently transcribed, resulting in nearly 27 pages 
of data (Appendix B). Interviews were then compiled and read several times, so that patterns 
could be found by meaningfully dissect and combine information (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
At last, data was reflected upon and findings connected to previous literature (ibid).  
IV. Empirical Study 
Auditor independence can be referred to as the ability to make unbiased judgements, 
free from other parties’ influences (Bazerman et al., 1997). In this regard, interviewee 1 
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conceptualizes it as the ability to “issue any opinion not influenced by future developments, 
behaviours or any type of opinion”. Further, interviewee 6 states that independence is not to 
have “interests in the entities we audit […] and interests can be monetary interests, can be 
personal, can be knowing someone in core functions in those entities”.  
Alternatively, as stated by DeFond et al. (2002, p. 1250), “auditor independence is often 
defined as the probability that the auditor will report a discovered breach in the financial 
reports”. Within this framework, interviewee 2 refers that a lack of independence is a matter of 
omission, further explaining: 
[…] independence it exists, i.e., I do my job, no one tells me not to do this or that, I do 
it and I have evidence (…) the question of independence lies in the omission in the 
opinion, that is, I do not issue an opinion based on all the facts that I have, because 
there are facts that I have no interest in issuing at this moment, so I omit.  
Despite being a controversial factor among researchers (Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981), 
interviewees manly perceived the provision of NAS as detrimental to auditor’s independence. 
In fact, some respondents are concerned that a conflict of interests may exist when services are 
provided by the same entity, as the firm can take advantage and time the sale of its services. 
Even though proponents argue that services are usually rendered in separate departments (Quick 
& Warming-Rasmussen, 2005), interviewee 1 highlights that it is still the same company 
providing them:  
Although it seems that there are two companies, one consulting and one auditing, in 
practice and in everyday life we are talking about the same company, the same people 
who share the same workplace with a common interest, and that is business […] there 
is almost a conflict of interests when it comes to doing business, through the planned 
sale of products and services. 
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Accordingly, interviewee 2 explains that the auditor will take the opportunity to emphasize 
client’s weaknesses, later recommending it to contract consulting services:  
The auditor will analyse the company in a holistic way, that is, see the company as a 
whole […] and knowing that his company also provides consulting services, will express 
a need, i.e., will make the company feel that there is a need to improve in certain areas. 
Additionally, this conflict is further exacerbated as auditors have to review their own 
work (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Simunic, 1984; Shockley, 1981). Therefore, 
respondents manifested concerns as to auditors’ ability to remain independent when auditing 
their companies: given that their professional judgment can be biased, auditors may hide errors 
related to other services so to protect the reputation of those (ibid). In this regard, interviewees 
3 and 4, respectively, suggest:  
[…] imagine there is restructuring consulting of the client and then any conflict is 
detected by the audit, and it was the same company that said to do so […] there will be 
a conflict. Perhaps, the [audit] opinion of the same company […] will not be impartial. 
If there is a material misstatement due to professional incompetence, to a poorly 
provided service, there may be a tendency to protect, since it is the same company. 
Notwithstanding, interviewee 6 has a slightly different position considering that, 
nowadays, the provision of NAS barely influences independence, and sustaining that “in 
Portugal, the maximum that can be provided of services is, normally, 30% in relation to audit 
services, as such, 30% has no influence”. However, this interviewee also enhances that, in the 
past, the discrepancy that could exist between services could lead the auditor to face more 
pressure as there was a strengthened economic bond:  
In the past, when I could have a client in which auditing was 20 thousand and consulting 
was 200 thousand there could be more of a pressure […] there is always more pressure 
when we depend on a non-audit remuneration. 
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Auditors’ economic dependence on clients is also argued to increase as competition 
increases: since in competitive markets clients can easily obtain services from an alternative 
company, auditors can compromise independence so to retain subsequent payoffs (Beattie et 
al., 1999; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Interviewee 2 clarifies: 
From the moment it is a business and the client has a large relative weight in the 
company’s sales volume, and knowing that there are other competitors that can enter 
and are anxious to enter, it stands to reason that competition is one of the limiting 
factors of independence. 
Furthermore, the search for a more acquiescent opinion is simplified as clients’ incentives and 
opportunities for replacement expand (Shockley, 1981). In this respect, interviewee 5 explains 
how competitive environments can either cause an auditor to compromise independence or 
foster opinion shopping practices:  
Competition wants to enter, and the client is not happy with the year’s audit. The auditor 
may turn a blind eye to something so that the client does not change to competition… 
Sometimes even the client may want to change to competition, so that competition turns 
a blind eye to certain situations. 
On the other hand, interviewee 6 dismisses an impact on independence, although 
highlighting how competitive markets can threaten audit quality: 
[…] if they enter into a price war is bad, because it is not possible in face of new audit 
requirements, new standards, a series of additional procedures that have to be done 
[…] it is not possible to carry out a good quality audit. 
Besides the above-mentioned factors, size has also been a subject of debate in literature. 
Researchers usually suggest that larger firms are perceived to be more independent than smaller 
firms: the former often holds a broader set of clients, assuring that no individual client is a 
considerable source of revenue (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2005; Gul, 1989; Shockley, 
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1981). As a result, a particular client is not considered as essential to a large audit firm as it is 
to a small firm. Interviewees 4 and 5 share this view, correspondingly suggesting: 
I think smaller companies are more prone to, perhaps, try to protect their position […] 
by wanting to keep the client and all, the work itself may not be done with quality or 
even independently. 
[…] small companies […] perhaps will not want to lose [an important client] due to 
issues related to opinion issuance… Can lead them to circumventing some situations so 
not to lose the client. 
Moreover, intrinsic characteristics to smaller firms, as the propensity to deliver more 
personalized services or to engage in closer relationships with clients, can induce a lack of 
independence (Gul, 1989; Shockley, 1981). Despite considering smaller firms more 
independent than large audit firms, interviewee 2 does not neglect the previous line of 
reasoning, enhancing: “In smaller companies there is the risk of proximity, i.e., between partner 
and client, and that is a big risk because they are often friends”. Also sustaining that smaller 
firms are more independent, interviewee 3 emphasizes: “financial scandals were in large 
companies. As noted, there was no impartiality, no independence”. 
 Conversely to previous analysed factors, auditor rotation has been discussed as a means 
of enhancing auditor independence (Daniels & Booker, 2011). In fact, when questioned about 
tenure’s potential impact on auditor independence, subjects mostly perceived rotation as a 
suitable enhancement factor. Interviewees 1 and 2 assert that rotation detaches auditor and 
client, allowing for a greater incentive to express an independent opinion. Further, a newly 
selected auditor is expected to both apply a “fresh perspective” to the auditing process and to 
reveal possible irregularities of the previous audit firm, hence avoiding negative effects arising 
from a lengthy tenure, such as complacency and reliance on previous work (Quick & Schmidt, 
2018). In this regard, some respondents state that the employment of a new perspective will 
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enable to disrupt dependency and to prevent repetitive errors from occurring. Interviewees 1 
and 4, respectively, sustain: 
Many times it is necessary to have other people looking at the same thing in order to 
have a different perspective on the issues and eventually disrupt a potential […] 
dependency between the client and the auditor […] if there are shorter terms, this 
connection ultimately fades away: from the moment I know I will not be able to further 
continue with a client, I have a greater incentive to provide a more independent opinion. 
[…] the reason to change […] is really not to allow repetitive errors and bring a new 
perspective, and even if there is a lack of independence, break with that lack of 
independence. 
However, recently assigned auditors can lack sufficient knowledge of the client’s 
business, which is critical to identify accounting misstatements (Daniels & Booker, 2011). 
Moreover, if the investment cannot be offset within the limited tenure, the auditor’s disposition 
to invest in client-specific knowledge can decrease (Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Accordingly, 
interviewee 6 recognizes both the initial absence of sufficient knowledge, and the investment 
required to provide the newly assigned auditor with sufficient understanding of the client’s 
business: 
With audit firm rotation there is an additional cost to both auditors and companies, 
because companies will have to explain everything again when a new auditor comes, 
and the new auditor is always, in the first, second years, in very large institutions, a big 
investment, so, the auditor is assigned to a client without knowing anything […] Knows 
public information, but does not know anything else. 
 Despite rotation’s potential as an enhancement factor, there is no guarantee that the 
client will not intimidate the auditor with a possible discharge before the rotation period ends 
(Quick & Schmidt, 2018). Therefore, as audit firms can compromise their independence by 
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fearing dismissal, mandatory retention is suggested as a means to ensure protection against 
management pressures (ibid). Correspondingly, interviewee 2 highlights: 
[…] if there is no retention […] [the auditor] knows he can leave every year. He may 
have a single term of five years, but knows that if he does not express […] [a particular] 
opinion, he can leave after one year, so he is always constrained in his opinion. 
Additionally, as auditors’ dismissal threats can also arise from opinion shopping practices, 
some support mandatory retention so to lessen this kind of opportunities (Lu, 2006; Lennox, 
2000). Interviewee 4 exemplifies: 
[A client] used to work with a small auditor that did not persisted much with certain 
aspects, suddenly gets a big company with greater experience, or another kind of tests, 
whatever the reason, that starts to find some errors. That can never be a reason to 
change […] To guarantee service’s quality, and that the reason to change is a proper 
reason, and not simply because the auditor is being much more annoying than the other, 
I think it is good to have retention. 
Similarly, some joint audits’ characteristics, as the “four-eyes principle” and the review 
of the other auditor’s work, have been suggested as improving audit opinions’ impartiality 
(Quick & Schmidt, 2018). In accordance, interviewee 5 perceives an improved independence, 
as auditing “would not be confined to methodologies from the same company”. Although 
assuming “[a joint audit] brings neither gains nor losses”, interviewee 4 further recognizes “It 
brings two viewpoints”. 
Conversely, interviewee 3 questions the joint application of methods and cooperative 
work’s efficiency, considering that “where two work policies are joint, two mentalities, two 
different entities” it would not work, justifying “I do not know a single auditor who speaks well 
of another auditor’s work, I do not see an auditor reading another’s opinion and saying “Good 
job!”. 
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Additionally, interviewee 6 perceives “no great advantage” in joint audits as “[the auditors] 
will not be doing the same thing, they will end up dividing tasks”. Similarly to interviewee 3, 
the interviewee further acknowledges interpersonal relationships as an additional constraint, 
exemplifying: 
Parmalat case happened exactly because there were several auditors involved, so the 
communication between them was not fantastic. When we have large groups in which 
some are here, and others are there, communication turns out not to be as good as if it 
was always the same auditor, the same company. 
Although not establishing a direct connection between an auditee’s financial condition 
and an auditor’s independence (Beattie et al., 1999; Knapp, 1985), some interviewees perceived 
a higher risk of legal exposure - associated with poor financial condition (Knapp, 1985) - as 
likely to enhance auditors’ independence. In this regard, interviewee 2 states that “[if] the 
company is subject to huge legal regulation […] the auditor is much more careful […] because 
the auditor is more exposed”. Moreover, and further mentioning reputation concerns, which 
may arise from litigation exposure, interviewees 1 and 4, respectively, suggest: 
It can affect in the positive sense […] a greater likelihood of facing legal issues in the 
future can lead to a greater independence and transparency in the auditor's work, due 
to the very consequences that arise from legal exposure. At the end of the day we are 
always talking about a brand reputation issue to the market. 
[…] if there are legal issues, the ability to remain independent is even greater, I think it 
increases, because the auditor’s risk is higher, the auditor has his company’s name and 
his own to defend […] in that case independence increases. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study shed light on how auditors perceive auditor independence, clarifying and 
providing a deeper understanding of auditors’ insights on a set of variables, which have long 
been discussed to impact independence. Both, the provision of NAS and the tenure of the audit 
firm have generated great consensus among interviewees. These factors were mainly perceived 
to negatively impact independence. Regarding tenure, auditors instinctively mentioned rotation 
as an enhancement factor. Litigation exposure was also perceived to improve independence. 
Because of the study’s qualitative character, no statistical generalizations can be made 
out of it. Besides, along with a small sample size, the study attempted to analyse and cover 
several factors, which may have contributed not to extensively address all topics. Nonetheless, 
the selected method was aligned with the purpose of the research, which can further be extended 
either to exploit other factors or the perceptions of different subjects. 
Additionally, the unavailability of audit companies to cooperate with the investigation 
has proven to be a challenge. Hence, as data gathering relied on personal connections, several 
limitations followed. First, as a few interviewees were no longer auditors, some answers may 
not reflect recent audit modifications, as respondents may not be aware of existing Portuguese 
legislation. Therefore, some bias may arise when considering results within a national context. 
Actually, as the study was meant to provide a broader perspective, a Portuguese sample may 
present itself a limitation, as auditors’ perceptions can be influenced by, among other factors, 
specific professional standards. 
Furthermore, not all respondents were senior auditors as previously anticipated: the 
study turn out to complement perspectives of professionals both at different career stages and 
of different companies. In this regard, it would also be interesting to investigate whether 
auditors’ perceptions of independence would differ in accordance with their functions or 
between small and medium-sized enterprises and ‘Big 4’ companies. 
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VII. Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Script  
1. Briefly, what does it mean to you to be independent in auditing? 
2. Do you think the provision of non-audit services, as for instance, consulting services, can 
influence auditor independence? How? 
3. When it comes to competition, in what way do you believe it can affect independence? 
4. In comparison to small firms, do you perceive big audit firms as more independent? Why 
do you think is that? 
5. What is your opinion towards lengthy audit tenure? In what sense is tenure good or bad? 
6. How do you feel towards auditor rotation? Do you think it can improve independence? 
7. What about auditor retention? Do you think it can influence independence? 
8. In the event of a joint audit, what would you expect regarding independence? 
9. Can you establish a connection between a client’s financial condition and the ability of the 
respective auditor to remain independent? 
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Appendix B: Interviews 
Interview 1  
1. Being independent in auditing means to be able to issue any opinion not influenced by future 
developments, behaviours or any type of opinion (that may be independent).  
2. Yes, I think it can, insofar as we are talking about the same company. Although it seems 
that there are two companies, one consulting and one auditing, in practice and in everyday 
life we are talking about the same company, the same people who share the same workplace 
with a common interest, and that is business. So, when there is this conjunction of situations, 
I think there is almost a conflict of interests when it comes to doing business (through the 
planned sale of products and services). 
3. Yes, eventually I think it can exist here some conflict. The more competitive the 
environment, the higher the need to retain a client and, possibly, to compromise 
independence, due to certain pressures. 
4. I do not have an opinion on that, I have never worked in a small company, so I end up not 
realizing how small audit companies work. (Do you think large companies can have some 
features that makes them more independent?) More independent? Honestly, I do not think 
so. 
5. I am in favour of shorter mandates, that is, of not having the same auditors for a long time. 
Many times, it is necessary to have other people looking at the same thing in order to have 
a different perspective on the issues and eventually disrupt a potential conflict of interests 
and dependency between the client and the auditor: there can often be a more promiscuous 
relationship here that can lead to an impartial opinion. I think that if there are shorter terms, 
this connection ultimately fades away: from the moment I know I will not be able to further 
continue with a client, I have a greater incentive to provide a more independent opinion. 
6. I am in favour, following the previous logic.  
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7. I think that it does not affect independence, when I speak of independence I am always 
speaking at a higher hierarchical level, so here we are talking about ... audit (where I did) 
technical work and execution of tasks, I do not think that independence is affected, because 
that is not where the big decisions are made. 
8. I would anticipate, perhaps, more independence and more transparency in the review of the 
subjects concerned and in the issue of an opinion. 
9. I cannot get a sense of that connection, about the financial condition of the client to retain 
the auditor, or the auditor being less independent for a large client, is not it? I cannot 
establish a direct connection between those two. (And between the likelihood of facing legal 
issues, i.e., do you think a greater likelihood of facing legal issues can influence 
independence?) I think, I guess. It can affect in the positive sense, therefore, a greater 
likelihood of facing legal issues in the future can lead to a greater independence and 
transparency in the auditor's work, due to the very consequences that arise from legal 
exposure. At the end of the day we are always talking about a brand reputation issue to the 
market. 
Interview 2 
1. We have to define independence, isn’t it? And to be independent is to express an opinion 
freely on the basis of audit evidence, that is, under evidenced facts, being able to express 
your opinion based on those facts and not having external misrepresentations that will 
constrain your opinion, that is independence, which should be underpinned in auditing. 
Independence is sometimes called into question by several factors. The auditor-client 
relationship. When the auditor audits the client is limited in his action because he will 
express an opinion that will call into question his client’s functioning, will lose his client. 
This happened, for instance, in BES and other cases where, when the client’s portfolio is 
big, imagine 40% of a company’s sales volume, that company will do everything not to lose 
29 
 
that client, so it is constrained in its action, and its independence is at stake. The question 
now is: there is auditor’s individual independence and there is audit firm’s independence. 
When the auditor does his work, he must report all facts to the several existing hierarchies, 
they should not conceal and must express it; who then expresses an official opinion is the 
one that can filter it. An example of a chain: an assistant is dependent on a senior, i.e., the 
senior guides the assistant’s work and will often get information from what he was 
developing; monitors the assistant’s work. If the assistant hides information, the opinion is 
distorted. The assistant should report all facts, who should then filter it or not is the senior 
auditor; the senior will have to evaluate in each moment of his action if that work that was 
developed is sufficient, is necessary, is relevant or not to his opinion; without external 
filters, i.e., if it is sufficient to support an opinion, why? Then the senior will report that 
work to the manager and the manager will only develop, establish with him a limited set of 
points, will not see all the work. What I mean by this is that if in this chain each one of them 
ceases to be independent and covers some information, even though one of them actually 
wants to be independent, he will no longer be, because he is lacking information. And this 
always limits the work of an auditor. The partner is the one who signs, the decision is always 
his. And why is there sometimes a loss of independence? Because the report is discussed 
with management before issuing, it is discussed with the client. There is a limitation, i.e., 
we will discuss the “weaknesses” with the client, and the client may say “no, wait, we 
will…”, that is, there must be a “negotiation relationship” with the costumer. Independence 
is always questioned from the moment there is a client relationship, i.e., there is a business 
relationship; from the moment auditing is a matter of business, even though independence 
is on paper, it is withdrawn in practice, i.e., it is lost. It does not mean that it is lost in its all, 
there are principles, there are limits, there are red lines… And it is no coincidence that you 
see some scandals in which the auditors were conniving, because for a long time, there are 
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always indications that are noticed: if the auditor does not express that opinion is hiding it, 
is missing a whole value chain (…) the several stakeholders, i.e., its investors, I am 
considering that I am investing in a particular asset that is worth a certain value when in 
practice it is not worth that value, so I was deceived. Why? Because I am relying on an 
opinion that I consider valid and independent and it has been lost, there is the case of Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat, BES. BES is a paradigmatic case of it. Independence is always an 
interesting word to put in the report, if you notice says there “an opinion expressed (…) 
independently”, and it is done independently, but it can be omitted, it is more by omission 
than by the fact that no opinion is given. What I mean by this is that independence it exists, 
i.e., I do my job, no one tells me not to do this or that, I do it and I have evidence, I have 
evidence, or I will seek evidence. The question of independence lies in the omission in the 
opinion, that is, I do not issue an opinion based on all the facts that I have, because there 
are facts that I have no interest in issuing at this moment, so I omit. What I am saying is that 
when I give an opinion in a report, imagine, I will express a reservation, maybe I should 
have another one, but I did not express it, so it is an omission, but I have it in my work, 
maybe I have sufficient elements to express that opinion, but I did not. So, I have 
independence at work; I “lose” that independence by omission in issuing an opinion. That 
is why we often have reports to management and reports to the outside. I think that the lack 
of independence is often more because of omission in the opinion than because of the 
elaboration of the work itself: we did the work, but we could not to express an opinion about 
what we saw. That is why we work very much with the concept of materiality. The concept 
of materiality is what we consider at some point in time, but it is not important and does not 
call into question the expression of the accounts. There are valid criteria and in the United 
States there was a lot of discussion in court about the concept of materiality because 
although being considered by the auditors it was not issued an opinion about that and took 
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the company into bankruptcy later on, so auditors’ defence was that the treaty was inferior 
to materiality’s value and was not itself object of opinion. The court (…) was “but are there 
criteria, objectives for the calculation of materiality?”, that is, is it the same amongst 
auditors, who defines those parameters, is the auditor individually, is the company where 
he works or is a set of international experts that defines these values? There are deadlines 
but essentially the concept of materiality is internally defined by each company and then 
each of the auditors, in this case managers and seniors, adjust to each of the entities they are 
auditing using their professional judgment. There is materiality concept and then there is a 
statistical concept which is the confidence interval: when we issue an opinion, we safeguard 
by saying that it only has a confidence level of 95%, (…), there is room for manoeuvre to 
both sides, either by the omission of what we cannot handle, or by the omission of what we 
do not express opinion. 
2. There is an underlying principle of business which is going-concern principle which means 
timelessness: a company, when it opens, is timeless its lifetime. That is a basic principle 
that underlies auditors’ work, i.e., an auditor tends to express an opinion in order to ensure, 
or at least, if he thinks that principle does not exist, to express an opinion about that 
principle, saying that the activity of the company (…) Consulting, in practice, is the 
definition of strategic plans, either (…) from the definition of what the company’s processes 
are, or from a future perspective. Imagine the definition of that strategy will put the 
company into question, i.e. (…) it will be verified that it called into question. What is the 
auditor’s role from the moment his company also defined that strategy? This is a small 
example. And then where is independence lost? The auditor opens weaknesses in his work, 
raising the need to contract other services. What do I mean by this? The auditor will analyse 
the company in a holistic way, that is, see the company as a whole, and often study its 
control environment among other things, and knowing that his company also provides 
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consulting services, will express a need, i.e., will make the company feel that there is a need 
to improve in certain areas. And who is going to handle it? The auditors will say “ah, there 
is…”, through recommendations. Express the weaknesses and make recommendations. 
Often these recommendations, although not expressed externally, i.e., in terms of official 
opinion because it does not affect the (accounts), but it affects the company’s organization 
and could be maximized in terms of costs or income, what is done? Makes room for the 
company to hire consulting services and who is going to do them? Who is in the front line? 
(…) Yes, regularly. From the moment you are manager you have to get customers, business 
volume. We manage portfolios and portfolios have to be maximized, that is why I say that 
when there is a customer relationship, the question of independence by omission is 
concerned. 
3. Of course. Like what I said earlier. From the moment it is a business and the client has a 
large relative weight in the company’s sales volume, and knowing that there are other 
competitors that can enter and are anxious to enter, it stands to reason that competition is 
one of the limiting factors of independence, that is, in the normal sectors (…) that there is 
competition in auditing, which is a very specific job and it is, should be of credibility of the 
information to the outside world, to all stakeholders. Once there is competition and the 
company needs to survive through the company-customer relationship, the competition 
limits in terms of price; so to not lose, there is omission in the opinion. 
4. No, Big 4 are less independent. They are less independent because they cover multiple 
business areas. Big 4 are those that are always looking for other business fields besides 
auditing. Who provides consulting? Essentially, Big 4. In smaller companies there is the 
risk of proximity, i.e., between partner and client, and that is a big risk because they are 
often friends. While in multinationals is from a business perspective, in small companies 
there is the risk of proximity between human relations.  
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5. Independence only existed when auditors were appointed by an independent entity, that is, 
like Banco de Portugal, like CMVM, in which they have a list of auditors and (…). They 
tried to improve independence through rotation. There are several measures introduced 
through a European directive that helps and heads in the right direction of improving 
auditors’ opinion, namely, their independence, which is a matter of rotation. Initially, it 
started by the rotation between partners, that is, between those who sign. It could be within 
the same company, but the partner had to be different (…) there I thought independence 
was residual. The last approach is that every seven years, especially in listed companies, 
there must be rotation and there, it helps. Although some independence can be gain in this 
way, it can be lost by not officially separating the businesses of multinational companies, 
that is, consulting, auditing… That is, audit companies could not do any other service, only 
auditing. Rotation helps to improve independence because I know that in seven years I will 
have to leave. I am an apologist for the single mandate, that is, imagine five years without 
being able to be changed and after five years I have to leave and for two terms, in the next 
ten years, I cannot audit that company. (That is, you are in favour of rotation, but also of 
retention?) Given that it is a single mandate, which implies rotation, I am not attached, and 
it is a single mandate without possibility (i.e., also retention) I am not stuck to client-auditor 
relationship, I am more impartial to express an opinion. 
6. (But at the same time the client has to retain it for a period of time) It is required. (Do you 
think there is any positive aspect also to independence?) Of course, totally, that is the focal 
point. Because if there is no retention, he knows he can leave every year. He may have a 
single term of five years, but knows that if he does not express an opinion, he can leave 
after one year, so he is always constrained in his opinion. That is why I say that the 
appointment should be a single mandate, with retention, appointed by an independent entity 
and not the company. The company would pay the independent entity the fees and the 
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independent entity would pay the audit service. There was a European Union directive in 
this regard, but it did not go forward. 
7. For instance, I had Polis Program, Polis Program was about reordering cities and seafront, 
where we had audit firms and we were auditors, that is, we worked together on the opinion. 
(How do you think it can influence independence, do you think it is positive or negative) 
No, it is more independent because you cannot say one thing when the other says something 
else, because both issue a report, it is not the same report, both issue a report. So, if one says 
something and the other says it is wrong, then entities will have to call them “what’s going 
on?” It forces, ah, only if both are in (…) then it is fraud. (Do you think there is a downside?) 
There is a negative side to companies, it is more expensive, everything turns out to be 
expensive, we have to consider financial capacity and to what extent we should go with 
joint audits, whether it is for the whole universe of companies, or what kind of companies? 
And you say, ah, but who has audits is limited, it is only from a certain amount that it is 
mandatory. Yes, but it is different to talk about a company that sells 3 million in which the 
margin is 2%, because it is not only by business volume, today we talk a lot about business 
volume but for me what matters is what generates in terms of margin, because if I sell and 
then I earns 2% or 1% (…) I am not generating value, or companies that sell 50, 100 or 200 
million, are totally different things. 
8. I said behind that the auditor’s work is to assess something that is the going-concern 
principle. When we are talking about the financial situation there are two sides: one has to 
do with the economic perspective and the other with the financial perspective, they are 
different. The financial perspective has to do with treasury management and then it must be 
considered in an economic cycle, that is, the company’s activity, and when we are 
evaluating the going-concern principle, the auditor has to be careful to understand whether 
it is a financial problem, i.e., short-term, in which the company is not being able to receive 
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what has already produced, and there is a cash flow problem and it is necessary to evaluate 
the quality of its assets to verify if it is a good quality asset, and it is only a cash flow 
problem, or, if coupled with the treasury problem also has an asset quality problem (…) in 
bank, that had to create impairments, why? Because assets value dropped significantly, 
automatically, it changed all its ratios, it had to be capital injection. They are different. The 
auditor, when considering the financial relationship and the auditor’s opinion, must be 
aware of these two things, why? Because an opinion referring that going concern principle 
is concerned is indicating to stakeholders that the company can go into insolvency, and it 
may not be true: the company may have economic capacity, without having sufficient 
financial capacity ate the moment to support… And specially to investors, imagine, I am 
issuing an opinion questioning the going-concern principle… A banking institution, to 
renew loans, always asks for an auditor opinion. (If the client has a healthier financial 
condition, do you think the auditor is more or less independent) I do not see independence 
like that. (What about the risk of legal exposure and independence) I think I am going to 
reverse the question. An auditor’s independence is not seen by the degree of economic 
maturity, that is, whether it is healthy or not, but by the type of work, by the type of company 
the auditor will audit, imagine the company is subject to huge legal regulation, for instance, 
environmental issues, the auditor is much more careful. That is, it is not about the economic 
situation, but (…) because the auditor is more exposed, independence is also often due to 
the exposure that will have (Reputation) Reputation and the effect that specific job will 
have, and then a greater or lesser work is developed… I will give you an example, auditing 
a public hospital is completely different from auditing a private company, why? Because 
the going-concern principle is not at stake, here (public hospital) if you have an insolvency 
problem, the State puts money here, does not go bankrupt, does not have to borrow, so the 
auditor’s work is directed in another way. In a company it is totally different. In this case, 
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the company is in the market, subject to competition, subject to a set of stakeholders who 
need to know information about the company’s situation; here (public hospital) who needs 
to know is the State, its shareholder, to know whether it has to put money, if the expense 
was well done, if it is legal or not. Auditors’ work is never the same, it depends on the sector 
of activity, and within it, it depends on the type of company. 
Interview 3 
1. We have rules of independence in which, to perform our functions, we should be unrelated 
to everything that incorporates the society we are auditing… Always have an exempt 
position (…) family ties, not at all, specially, we have rules in our company where we sign 
a list of clients, and when there is no independence in familiar terms, which happens, people 
working who have companies with their fathers and do not have independence to do their 
job in that society, as well as friendships, all ties, that later the company itself (this is my 
second audit company), and the companies themselves also define their own rules of the 
concept, usually always integrated into international concepts, we are a small company 
connected to a concept, we also have to respect all parent company’s rules, but essentially, 
it is exemption, the ability to issue a totally impartial opinion without being influenced by 
anyone.  
2. Typically, a company providing audit services should not provide related services to the 
same client, such as accounting. It is not the reality of the market, but, usually… For 
instance, if a society has the two strands, even three strands of consulting, auditing, and 
accounting, usually, although consulting…. Accounting really is a head-on collision. 
Consulting, if it is in a specific area… But, as a rule, it should not. It should always be 
reported or requested an opinion to an external entity that has no ties to the audit firm that 
is developing the audit service. (What do you think about providing both services?) For 
example, let’s imagine there is restructuring consulting of the client and then any conflict 
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is detected by the audit, and it was the same company that said to do so. Do you see what I 
mean? There will be a conflict. Perhaps, the opinion of the same company, the audit opinion 
will not be impartial. (But, on the other hand, do you think there is any advantage?) 
Sometimes, yes, it makes our job easier, if there is rigor on the consulting team’s part, it is 
much easier for us when we get there, we know it was that team, it was our company, it will 
be well done, if it is credible, right? Sometimes it is not like that. 
3. Yes, nowadays there are many auditors in the market, there are many audit firms, there is a 
fierce pricing policy. Now, if you had asked me that question before CMVM entered the 
audit world I would say yes, now I do not. (Do you think it does not affect independence?) 
No, because auditors’ risks today, or specially who is signing, our risk is to issue a wrong 
opinion about the accounts and that someone influences us to issue, for instance, a clean 
opinion when the company has problems. Nowadays, the auditor no longer does that 
because given the financial scandals we had in Portugal CMVM entered so, it is really bad, 
they now arrive, especially those who have an entity that provides services (…) public 
interest entities are companies of huge risk. So CMVM comes in but then it does a 
horizontal check: it can just be that one and if it finds (…) it gets two or three more that 
have nothing to do with public interest entities. So, I think nowadays the auditor can, 
perhaps, that policy, but no auditor just signs, which would happen some years ago. It was 
a lot about friendship and all and perhaps (…) there were no reservations because he was a 
friend, nowadays (…) 
4. No. I have seen large audit companies’ opinions, Big 4, that… In fact, financial scandals 
were in large companies. As noted, there was no impartiality, no independence. I do not 
think so. Company’s independence also depends on who is in front of the company, who 
are the partners that manage it, whether they are credible, exempt and professional people, 
essentially professionals, issue an impartial opinion. Usually, we do (I do not know about 
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other companies) but, usually, we do interim, intermediate visits to do a small analysis and 
help the client, alert him. Then if the client does not correct, the risk is his and he takes it, 
but we will put reservations about those situations. But I will not say we do not try to have 
a friendly relationship, despite independence, of course, I will not say otherwise. Because 
if we do not have… we are people always interfering in other’s work, annoying activities, 
asking for things, and without friendship, a chat over coffee, whether it is raining, it has to 
be to break the ice… But then we have to be professionals at the same time. (In that regard, 
do you think friendships can be stronger in small companies than in big ones?) Yes, because 
usually, small companies try to keep the work team, and in big ones those responsible are 
always responsible but then the team below rotates; and then the resources, while a big 
entity has several people, one does the assets, another does the fiscal, (…) in small entities, 
one does everything. So, it ends up by developing more, what does not mean that as an 
auditor, as a manager of the company and all, that does not exist in big ones, but you know, 
what I am saying is that it does not reach… Also, usually, big companies belong to big 
economic groups, so it ends up by not having a connection at all because a lot of people are 
involved. But yes, small companies have more friendship. (And do you think it can 
compromise independence?) I do not think so. No, I am auditing a company where the 
financial director is my boss’s former colleague, I mean, deep down, it is that… But my 
boss is an extremely professional personal, if he has to put a reservation, he puts it, and the 
financial director also has a good accountant so has no reason to have reservations because 
things are correct, but there is that one detail. (…) But a professional is a professional. No 
because, nowadays, the company I belong to has a lot of entities, a lot of hospitals, (…) so 
it is a risk not to put a reservation or an emphasis on a certain point of the accounts when 
we know we can be audited by other entities, (…). (So there is another point here, legal 
exposure) Everything. CMVM fines are around or above 5 thousand, it is a big risk. As the 
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risk is increasingly large, as I was saying, nowadays, with CMVM, independence is not 
called into question, if you had told me, some years ago, before financial scandals, if you 
had told, perhaps, there was not so much independence, I would say “if the boss is a client’s 
friend”, “see what you can do…”, there were last minute calls, we did the work, we prepared 
things but then someone else would sign it and sometimes they would cut things, because 
there were calls, there were promises… Nowadays this does not happen, I will be honest, 
today it really does not happen because there is rigor and what is at stake is a lot of money 
and prices are not so… There are many auditors in the market and prices are not that high 
and so they do not put themselves at risk like before. Today the client can say “there are 
other auditors in the market” but none, only if it is an auditor who… just entered to the 
market, has no risk… But even the Order it’s on top of new companies, new auditors, almost 
all are audited as early as the first two, three years in which they begin to perform reviewer 
roles, so today I think more and more the term independence is very strong. Opinion is 
always put with several, we have just now been validating to public entities budget and 
investment plans to 2019, it has a lot of warnings because we know, we look, we read 
something and yet, there is still friendship in the supervisory board, it is independence, we 
see that it is not well. 
5. It is not good, that is why after (at least) seven years it must rotate both the auditor, and the 
audit team (…) long-lasting friendship relations. But, normally, what I have detected is that 
the auditor changes, but the team stays, it stays but it changes because the society is made 
up of more than one reviewer and can even stay the same. In public interest companies it 
cannot, after a certain time that society leaves, it is required to, has a term after which it has 
to leave, everyone, nobody stays there for a very long time (…) Although there are rules, 
there may always be someone who facilitates, but little, I think in big companies and all, 
where it is more questioned, nowadays is very difficult. (Is there any positive aspect in 
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keeping the same auditor? Yes (…) if there is exemption and impartiality in the opinion, 
despite the relationship of friendship, it is good because he client is used to that person, and 
the person is also accustomed to the client, the way of saying, of driving things forward, 
than if someone else comes, because we are human, and we all have different personalities, 
we can work in the same business, but some are ruder than others (…) And we do not have 
a market, mostly it is small and medium-sized companies where one can get there and say, 
“I will not but you anything else this month…”, claiming. But today rotativity is only 
questioned in public interest companies, small companies continue with the same auditor 
for many years, and they will always. 
6. It depends on the situation, there are situation where the auditor himself that is the service 
provider upsets and are dismissed. (But in this case that would not be possible, how would 
this be either positive or negative?) I think it is negative, because, let’s imagine there are 
conflicts between them, they do not get along, being forced to be there, first, the auditor 
will be looking for sure for any mistake… There is no good relationship… When there is 
not… I have just noticed something, I went upstairs to the Financial Direct, or she has a 
doubt, calls me right away, “How should I account this?” “What procedure should I do?”, 
this does not happen. (So, it would not be good to maintain a good relationship, although, 
on the other hand, as you said the auditor would pay more attention to all mistakes) Ah, yes. 
(But, would he be more independent, or not?) I do not know. I do not think so. I think, 
nowadays, independence is a synonym of professionalism, if a person is independent, is 
professional, if one is not a good professional anything corrupts. But a professional that 
looks to… that knows what he has to do, what he has to see, what is at stake, because the 
risk of a wrong opinion is large, it is our daily risk, is not it? Of not seeing, detecting serious 
or less serious situations, that should have been reported and were not, that is a risk. Another 
one is to detect and someone else tells us not to report. Now, if we are professional that 
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shall be above all else. In my opinion, as I have no cases, I do not know cases in which this 
was called into questions, other than a few years ago, in the other company, there was an 
auditor that… yes. (Compromised…) Independence, a little. It was favours. But he should 
not. Because nowadays (you should not), and one of the companies even went to court, not 
because of us, but regarding taxation and perhaps if… but we were no longer auditors, we 
were already out of the market. But has always shocked me that company had no 
reservations. Why? Because… (Friendship?) I never understood. I do not know if it was… 
The owner was also a bit crazy, the auditor wanted to keep the customer because he paid 
well, he wanted to keep the client because he paid very well, on time, of course, when clients 
are like these we try, is not it? A client who pays on time, owes you nothing, pays a good 
fee. (But then he faced legal issues) Yes. I think today even business owners themselves are 
warned that things are different, it can be noted that… (The client?) The customer now also 
realizes that if they are getting something wrong, they cannot have no reservations, and they 
are also changing by… Because they also have… Nowadays, the fiscal area is (…) the 
problem is essentially… there are a lot of frauds in the market. In labour market, 
small/medium company, what happens, it is always a taxation problem, you see? What do 
companies want? Not to pay tax authorities. Even state-owned companies do not want to 
pay taxes. But they know things have to be minimally right and sometimes they even ask 
the auditor, perhaps for certain situations they can do in a timely manner, it is not to question 
independence, it is to ask for help in a process, to be the best registered, and also not to be 
so harmful to the company itself, for instance, a car, today a car in a company, if it is a high 
capacity car, it is a big cost because besides paying all taxes, then in autonomous taxation 
that is extremely expensive. And maybe, if you can share in the person’s income in kind, 
the company will not pay so much, and the person is not that affected. Those suggestions 
they can ask the auditor, not questioning independence, but having things right with 
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someone’s help, but there are things that if they do, the auditor has to be… (You reminded 
me of a question, reputation) (…) Right now, the company I belong to has at least seven 
health authorities, hospitals and ARS, why? Because of the good name and reputation the 
auditor has. (So it is an important factor) Very important, and although his opinions are not 
clean, they are exempt, we have hospitals with seven or eight reservations and yet his 
services are requested because besides seeing things we also try to help and warn against 
problems they themselves want to solve and cannot, they do not know how, because the 
auditor usually has more knowledge and also because he is auditing other entities that, 
perhaps, have the (same) problem, business knowledge, we can cover more situations given 
the insights we already have of others. Especially reputation. That is really important. Very 
important indeed. (Can it work as an incentive to independence?) Yes, always, because 
nowadays if it is a good auditor the door opens quicker to be honest. It is not only about 
money, but about integrity, support and exemption, especially exemption and knowledge.  
7. Joint. We have examples of that in which the auditor and the reviewer, it is a joint opinion, 
because, for instance, the parent company is audited by a group and the subsidiaries are 
audited by others, and consolidation is done together, we have to issue (…) and usually 
works well, it does not question independence. (Do you think it helps independence?) It 
depends, but it helps, the group gets stronger because we have two different opinions. In 
some situations where the reviewer does not work in a particular area, for example, imagine 
it is a large group were I review here, and another reviewer does it there and then (…) all 
reviewers do inventories, and, in my consolidation, I will have inventories that I do not even 
have, but by what they will tell me of inventories I will form an opinion in parent company 
without having any inventories, and usually works. And if one says that is all wrong, he is 
exempt and says that, he knows this one is exempt, and he will put that my affiliate has a 
problem here and there of the company that I am… But typically there are questionnaires 
43 
 
that are issued to one another to say what it was, so one can see the level of exemption of 
the one below. There are basic questionnaires sent to one another, typically who 
consolidates sends them. (But, for example, in this case you would have to split the work) 
I do not know if that would work out. For example, imagine, it would not work out, I will 
tell you why… A spin-off of audit firms, I have been through that, where two work policies 
are joint, two mentalities, two different entities, it did not work, there was a split soon after, 
one year later, because methods, there are many audit firms in the market, but methods… 
(But, for instance, in a joint audit, what happens is, there are two auditors, each responsible 
for his own part, and then they review each other’s work and sign together) I have never 
been through that process, I will tell you my opinion. From the market I know, I do not 
know a single auditor who speaks well of another auditor’s work, I do not see an auditor 
reading another’s opinion and saying, “good job”, there is always something there, because 
he did not see that aspect, because… So I do not believe in joint audits, from where I stand 
(That would not work) I do not think so. No, not for me, because as I told you, I have the 
example of a spin-off of another company I was in and that did not work well. (And because 
auditor’s do not say well about each other’ work, so here in reviewing, it would not be) Bad. 
Reviewing an entity’s work, for instance, this year we will have to review the work of 2016, 
done by the previous auditor, they will not simplify this review, they will not give us all the 
information needed. (When reviewing an auditor’s work, do you think you are more 
independent?) Reviewing a colleague’s work? (No, from another company) Yes, it is more 
independent if I have to review a colleague’s work, I will pick up the phone if that is not 
well done and I will scold him. (And if it is another company?) No, to another company I 
will not, there it is, among co-workers, but in that case, independence is not at stake. (You 
will audit a company that has previously been audited by another company, in this case, is 
there something…) Yes, the correct procedure is, (…), either we trust his work, review it 
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and say the opinion he issued in the previous year was correct, if not, we would only put 
reservations in some items that, although last year did not have reservations, as we cannot 
have, e.g., inventories, typically we watch physical counts and if we are not there, we have 
to put a reservation because we are not present, we do not know if what is there is what 
should be, we do a sample but from that sample we extrapolate, if we have a certain expected 
error, extrapolating to a 100% of the universe, we have more, but usually, it works like this. 
Now if last year’s reviewer did not give us access to information, so we can review it, you 
see. (Do you think there is more caution in this initial phase?) Yes, first because we do not 
even know the client we want to know, see how it works, audit tests, and then we already 
know how it works. (But do you think, as it is an initial phase, do you think you depend 
more on client’s opinion or information, and that can have a negative impact?) Yes, it 
depends a lot on the information the client gives us. (And can it be negative to…) Yes, 
because, we will end up concluding that maybe what the client said to us was not right; that 
is why when I am with my assistants, the first thing I say to them is, in auditing the first 
thing we have to do is to check procedures, is to do an analytical review, see how the 
accounts are. And an analytical review is only done with a balance sheet, with an income 
statement, with the person in charge to explain the variations. Then when we start doing 
substantive testing, controls testing and all, we will see and detect that perhaps that 
evaluation was not quite like that. And from there we start seeing with the client, we start 
analysing him, if he is honest, because sometimes he is not, and does not give us what he 
should. (But this whole process is still in time for the report) Yes. We always try to do 
interims, not just to close accounts, when there is no time to solve anything. (And if you 
compare a first report with a second one, you already know…) Yes, yes, we already know 
more about the area, the weaknesses, were to interfere… A first report is always a discovery, 
see what was wrong last year and try to see if really was so. The first year is always a bit 
45 
 
more difficult because we have to know people, we have to know the process, how it works 
and all, is more in-depth. Then, as the years go by, there is always control testing to do, but 
it is already different from first year’s auditing, in any client, a first year is much more 
laborious. (But do you think it can call into question…) No, no. I think independence, in 
auditing, especially in the first year is not called into question. (Do you think report users 
can rely on it?) Yes, I think so, in my view when we issue a report, it has to be correct 
because it is going to be used not only by administration, but also by other entities that will 
read it, and if we are issuing one (of those reports) … It is not advisable.  
8. It depends, because when companies are not ok no matter how much we do not want to, we 
get a little involved, of course the healthier the company, the better, the better the 
environment, it does not mean independence, or that I will not put reservations because… 
Is that human side working but independence is not at stake because we will have to say the 
company will not pull through. Today independence is not at issue almost nowhere, at least 
in companies I am present, I have never been in a small society, although not a Big 4, are 
entities with rules, very specific rules about independence, we have handbooks, a lot to fill 
that always question independence… Offers, all of that has a manual, we can only accept it 
up to a certain amount, if it is exceeded, we have to report to an auditor who, a partner, to 
know that that client is giving us an offer above… At bottom all team is being corrupted. 
Interview 4 
1. Being independent in auditing is to basically give an independent opinion, that is, to carry 
out audit work so to issue an independent opinion about company’s accounts and to be sure 
numbers are in accordance, represent the company’s financial reality to an external entity.  
2. Yes, I think so. If there is a material misstatement due to professional incompetence, to a 
poorly provided service, there may be a tendency to protect, since it is the same company, 
independence may be called into question, yes. (On the other hand, do you think is there 
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any advantage in the simultaneous provision of these services?) Depends on the services, 
for instance, I think fiscal and taxation, because it is a financial audit, not a fiscal audit, that 
is, I think fiscal can really have advantages, meaning, I think it is more independent, it can 
be more independent and can get advantages from the work we have done for a greater 
knowledge of all company’s actions, so I would say in terms of fiscal consulting, yes, and 
even processes, it also can be, because processes matter in final but not directly, so I would 
say process optimization and fiscal, I think so.  
3. In terms of independence, no. It can affect work quality, but not independence. No. The 
competition problem is the first audit works and first teams, but there is always a very strong 
message to do a quality job, and not facilitate, because there is also a maximum number of 
years to rotate and all, so I do not think so. (In terms of quality, can you specify it a little 
more?) Audit company’s tendency, year after year, is to start gaining more confidence as 
they spend more time in a client. As such, teams’ knowledge level reduces, many times the 
teams reduce so to (choose) budget, that is, to competition, so there is a tendency to have 
more junior staff doing clients, which perhaps was previously done by senior staff, and that 
can be reflected in quality and in critical sense of looking at values. You always have to do 
everything for this not to happen, but it is a risk. 
4. Comparing to small companies? This is by feeling and not by the full knowledge of facts, 
but I would say yes, I think smaller companies are more prone to, perhaps, try to protect 
their position. I think small companies tend to be less independent. (Why do you think so?) 
It is a feeling, it is just because, as the market revolves a lot around Big 4, I think, and even 
by clients (…) by small companies, either was another kind of… That is, I have noticed that 
clients who have had small companies were more error-prone, i.e., perhaps there was more 
easily an error. Maybe sometimes, by wanting to keep the client and all, the work itself may 
not be done with quality or even independently. Because a large (company) has a larger 
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portfolio of clients to manage. (Do you think the client is more important to the small audit 
company than to…?) Yes, there is more dependency, yes. 
5. I think there is eight-year rotation, I am against being able to only rotate the partner and not 
the company, I think it should be mandatory to rotate the company. (That is, you are in 
favour of auditors’ rotation) I am, I am in favour of rotation and I think it should be done 
differently because the same company can be kept, for example, the company says that 
changes the partner, and I do not agree with that, I think it should be mandatory to change 
the company, partners are right next to each other. (Can you explain a little more why do 
you agree?) I think the reason to change a company or a partner is really not to allow 
repetitive errors and bring a new perspective, and even if there is a lack of independence, 
break with that lack of independence, i.e., given there is an option to only change the 
partner, which can be from the same company, partners are in the same meetings, they often 
share teams, that is, it can be the person next to you, so I think a simple change of partner 
will not be able to mitigate all those risks. (Is there any positive side about repetition?) Yes, 
during maybe up to three years, yes, up to three years the same person, because then teams 
also change, I would say two years, because then you start getting a little addicted, but two, 
three years a person gains experience, so also improves critical approach, I speak from 
experience. That is, you will get to better know the business, because the auditor has that 
problem, is an outsider, so his business knowledge is not as much as that of the people 
working there, so is a knowledge that evolves, so I would say two or three years is important, 
perhaps from the third year on the propensity starts to be more to addiction than to continue 
to increase client’s knowledge. 
6. I think so (it can have advantages), I think so, without a doubt. Just as I think turnover is 
advantageous, retention is also good because, taking the example I gave, the client who used 
to work with a small auditor that did not persisted much with certain aspects, suddenly gets 
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a big company with greater experience, or another kind of tests, whatever the reason, that 
starts to find some errors. That can never be a reason to change, i.e., I think to guarantee 
service’s quality and that the reason to change is a proper reason and not simply because 
the auditor is being much more annoying than the other, I think it is good to have retention. 
7. I think it brings neither gains nor losses. I have already done it, I do not think… It brings 
two viewpoints, of course, perhaps you can also gain a little, there is that propensity to want 
to show work but in terms of independence I would say no more, no less. 
8. I want to believe, and I believe that there is no relationship. (What if it is between the 
likelihood of facing legal issues and the auditor’s ability to remain independent?) I think 
that if there are legal issues, the ability to remain independent is even greater, I think it 
increases, because the auditor’s risk is higher, the auditor has his company’s name and his 
own to defend. When there is legal risk, because usually the auditor is not faced with many 
legal risks, he is more with financial risks, i.e., I think in that case independence increases, 
I think it will increase, given the risk of fraud and all. Fortunately, I was not confronted 
many times, but from the experiences I had I can say I was much more alert.  
Interview 5 
1. It means not to adjust auditing to the client, to client’s or business’s difficulties, and distract 
from, not to circumvent any of these. 
2. It can. (How do you think it can affect?) Because you can take as granted something that is 
not. (Can you explain it?) For example, consulting can assemble some processes and just 
because it is the same company to assemble those it does not mean they are right. Sometimes 
they do not look at it and auditing should. (On the other hand, do you think there are 
advantages arising from the provision of both services?) Ah, there are advantages, yes, to 
the audit company, to the firm that is providing the service because it may already know the 
business, know the client, and facilitate, it is easier to gain efficiencies.  
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3. Yes, as we had just spoken, about circumventing or turning a blind eye to something, 
competition also can, is not it? Competition wants to enter, and the client is not happy with 
the year’s audit. The auditor may turn a blind eye to something so that the client does not 
change to competition… Sometimes even the client may want to change to competition, so 
that competition turns a blind eye to certain situations. 
4. Larger firms are more independent, yes. (Why do you think is that?) Because small 
companies are more dependent while large companies are not, small companies can lose an 
important client and perhaps will not want to lose due to issues related to the opinion 
issuance… Can lead them to circumventing some situations so not to lose the client. (So, 
do you think the client is more important to small companies than to large companies?) Yes, 
exactly. 
5. I think rotation should be mandatory. (What do you think rotation could mitigate?) The 
method of looking at things, sometimes it is such a (diffused) situation and you do not apply 
another method of evaluating information, and another company may have a different 
methodology and can detect, is not it? Because one has no obligation to detect, but if 
detected, has the obligation to disclose that situation, and, changing the methodology, 
changing the tests, all new, more is uncovered (…) (On the other hand, is there any 
advantage in being with the same client for a few years?) I think it has advantages, but to 
the client.  
6. I think it is indifferent.  
7. Independence would improve. I think there would be greater independence, it would not be 
confined to methodologies from the same company, but rather (from those available). 
8. I do not think it exists. I think it would not change, the person is not obliged to find, but if 
you find, you are obliged to divulge, if I find and not divulge it is serious, and then I cease 
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to be independent, but if it does not have any variation, neither I stop being independent nor 
I become more independent. 
Interview 6 
1. Being independent is not having interests in the entities we audit, i.e., for which we provide 
audit services, and interests can be monetary interests, can be personal, can be knowing 
someone in core functions in those entities, for instance, the financial director, my wife, or 
my uncle, or my father, my mother. And then independence has two sides, that 
independence (…) independence in appearance, that is not to accept any kind of reward, of 
gift from entities. Although often immaterial, outsiders’ idea may not be so, and we should 
ensure people see us as independent of institutions. Usually having lunch with clients when 
we are there auditing them is (not) normal, on a weekend a client invites us to spend the 
weekend with him, is not, or invites us to have dinner with his family, we may be getting a 
little too close to the question of independence, more in a concept for the exterior than for 
the interior.  
2. At the moment, considering (sales), it hardly influences, because in Portugal, the maximum 
that can be provided of services is, normally, 30% in relation to audit services, as such, 30% 
has no influence. In the past, when I could have a client in which auditing was 20 thousand 
and consulting was 200 thousand there could be more of a pressure, it is more a matter of 
pressure than calling independence into question because, of course, there is always more 
pressure when we depend on a non-audit remuneration, but with 2016’s new rules I think 
that was more or less solved, and it is not allowed in listed companies (…) more than 30% 
(…) so, it was applied to more or less ensure, exactly that kind of… 
3. Not independence. It can affect is, if they enter into a price war is bad, because it is not 
possible in face of new audit requirements, new standards, a series of additional procedures 
that have to be done, which in recent years have been added by regulators, it is not possible 
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to carry out a good quality audit in (several) proposals constantly when following a tender, 
there is a 40%, 50% reduction in the previous price, it destroys the market and the quality 
to client. It is not about independence itself, they are always independent, it is much more 
about rotation, rotation is good but every time there is a (…) there is a 30% fall (…) unusual, 
that I do not believe, or to maintain services quality we have to keep (…) or others we had 
from the past. (How would quality be at stake?) The involvement of so many people, of so 
many resources, with more experience, engagements are also internally evaluated for their 
(loyalty), when estimating budget the goal is to have a positive result in that engagement, if 
we do not have, if (…) it does not bear to involve people that we should involve, is bad, 
internally, as far as I am aware of, when there are those situations the client is not accepted, 
when we are not able to do a job with the quality we should, either (…) increases, or there 
is no proposal.  
4. No, that is not the point. We have rules, I think the only difference is, compliance is the 
same because the rules are the same, the only difference is that we, besides the external 
monitoring that we have in Portugal, CMVM and OROC, we have our internal which is as, 
or more demanding than CMVM or OROC and therefore, we are annually subject to internal 
quality control that evaluates those situations. 
5. It has advantages and disadvantages. When rotation was discussed, and it was discussed 
some years ago, when there were cases of United States, of Enron and WorldCom, so in 
United States rotation has not yet been adopted, they are considering, at the time rotation 
was considered when Parmalat took place in Italy. Italy has rotation for more than thirty 
years, so even though there was rotation, fraud still prevailed in that entity, for instance, on 
the one hand, rotation is good because they are new faces, we already had rotation internally, 
in the past, rotation worked so that the partner had to rotate at the end of a certain time, so 
regardless of not rotating the auditor, at least the partner rotated, and who entered had no 
52 
 
knowledge of that client (…). With audit firm rotation there is an additional cost to both 
auditors and companies, because companies will have to explain everything again when a 
new auditor comes, and the new auditor is always, in the first, second years, in very large 
institutions, a big investment, so, the auditor is assigned to a client without knowing 
anything… Without knowing anything… Knows public information, but does not know 
anything else. (Do you think in the first years auditors depend very much on the information 
the company provides to them?) In every year, every year depends a lot on the information 
that is obtained from the company, what happens is that in the first year everything is new, 
in the second year we have a basis and we update the basis in the face of possible changes 
that may have existed in the entity. (What would be the negative side in preserving the same 
auditor?) Here is to avoid a matter of “getting used to it”, fresh eyes are (in)different of a 
person who is there for five or six years. 
6. It is somewhat indifferent. At the moment, it can have three mandates, so it can be up to 
seven years or ten, if there are more mandates, but there are other countries, so Germany 
can go up to twenty, it depends on what countries adopt in terms of minimums or of 
maximums allowed in standards. 
7. There is no great advantage, they will not be doing the same thing, they will end up dividing 
tasks, so, in France there is already joint audits and has not had, I think it has not had that 
great of an improvement of independence by having joint audits, is the only country I know 
from Europe that has joint audits. I think that measure was kind of the question (…) of 
clients as of auditors do not have, it is difficult to implement. (So, by doing different tasks 
it ends up by not bringing significant benefits, right?) Parmalat case happened exactly 
because there were several auditors involved, so the communication between them was not 
fantastic. When we have large groups in which some are here, and others are there, 
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communication turns out not to be as good as if it was always the same auditor, the same 
company. 
8. There is an independence that is, we cannot resume a work the following year until we are 
paid the fees of the previous year, so, we have clients that do not have the ability to pay (…) 
limiting our performance in the second year and the acceptance of another auditor because 
even if auditors change, we always have to communicate (to the previous one) if there is 
any situation that (…) (If there is greater exposure to legal issues, do you think it will impact 
independence?) No, not in Portugal, in Portugal I am not aware of having been called into 
question so far, in terms of courts, any question related to auditors’ independence, as far as 
I know. In other countries yes, Brazil, one of the Big 4 was fined 10 million because of the 
very close relationship of the auditor with the CFO, so there are situations like this, but in 
Portugal I am not aware that there is, but anyway we have our internal mechanisms to 
mitigate that this can happen.  
